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The Money Blind: How to Stop 
Industry Bias in Biomedical Science, 
Without Violating the First 
Amendment  
Christopher T. Robertson† 
The pharmaceutical and medical device industries use billions 
of dollars to support the biomedical science that physicians, 
regulators, and patients use to make healthcare decisions—the 
decisions that drive an increasingly large portion of the American 
economy. Compelling evidence suggests that this industry money 
buys favorable results, biasing the outcomes of scientific research. 
Current efforts to manage the problem, including disclosure 
mandates and peer reviews, are ineffective. A blinding 
mechanism, operating through an intermediary such as the 
National Institutes of Health, could instead be developed to allow 
industry support of science without allowing undue influence. If 
the editors of biomedical journals fail to mandate that industry 
funders utilize such a solution, the federal government has several 
regulatory levers available, including conditioning federal 
funding and direct regulation, both of which could be done 
without violating the First Amendment. 
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BIASED SCIENCE 
Scholars estimate that between thirty and forty-five percent of the growth 
in medical spending is driven by the decisions of prescribers, patients, and 
payors to adopt new medical technologies produced by the drug and device 
industry.1 This industry spends billions of dollars to create these innovative 
products, but also spends about as much to change the behavior of 
prescribers, consumers, and payors to ensure that they are purchased.2 
Against this onslaught, regulators restrict the industry’s promotional efforts 
on behalf of these products, in order to protect patient welfare and to optimize 
the expenditure of public and private healthcare money, so that it is not 
wasted on products that are inefficient, ineffective, or even dangerous in a 
given application. These regulators of promotional efforts are, however, 
constrained by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
protects the industry’s right to commercial speech.3 Here, the battle lines are 
drawn.4 
In some ways, however, the industry’s efforts to influence biomedical 
science are more profound and more disconcerting than the industry’s explicit 
promotional activities. When successful in its efforts to manipulate 
biomedical science, the industry transforms the very epistemological basis 
that scientists, regulators, juries, physicians, and patients rely upon to assess 
the safety and adequacy of industry products. Such influence literally changes 
what we think we know about these products. This section documents the 
problem of industry influence in biomedical science, and explains why status 
quo solutions are inadequate.  
A. Industrial Science as Commercial Speech 
Biomedical science is the boundary-setting precondition for industry 
promotional efforts. As a veteran of the industry writes, “in the 
pharmaceutical industry, there are two ways to market an approved drug for a 
new use: the ‘indication’ route—performing studies necessary for regulatory 
                                                   
1 E. Ray Dorsey et al., Funding of US Biomedical Research, 2003-2008, 303 JAMA 137, 
142 (2010) (citing Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness 
Information, 25 Health Aff. w572 (2006)). 
2 See Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States , 5 PLoS Med. 29, 32 n.4 (2008); 
id. at 32 (discussing a PhRMA press release claiming that in the U.S. the industry spent $29.6 
billion on R&D in 2004 and $27.7 billion for all promotional activities, which the authors note 
excluded several major categories of promotional activities, suggesting a conclusion that 
“pharmaceutical companies spend almost twice as much on promotion as they do on R&D”). 
Whatever its precise size, such an enormous investment in promotional activities would be 
irrational if it did not change the behavior of physicians and consumers. Some such changes in 
behavior are of course salutary, if they drive a doctor away from an obsolete treatment and 
towards one that is instead effective, safe, and economical—one that just happens to be 
patented by a major pharmaceutical company. 
3 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (overturning certain 
regulations that pertained to prescription drug compounding as unconstitutional restrictions 
on commercial speech). 
4 See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
Vermont statute violated the First Amendment by restricting prescribing information 
available to manufacturers who used such information to send “detailers” to influence 
physicians), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011). 
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approval—or the ‘publication’ strategy, which stimulates off-label prescribing 
by using research ‘to disseminate the information as widely as possible 
through the world’s medical literature.’”5 Both of these routes crucially turn on 
the industry’s ability to procure scientific studies that purport to support their 
product. Thus, in a practical sense, biomedical science is the industry’s first 
avenue of promotion. A longtime editor of the British Medical Journal 
provocatively titled his own article on the phenomenon, “Medical Journals 
Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical Companies.”6 The 
industry apparently concurs in this assessment. In a strikingly candid 
document produced by Pfizer, the company asks, “What is the purpose of 
publications?” The answer: the “purpose of data is to support, directly or 
indirectly, the marketing of our product.” Or in short: “Purpose of 
Publications: The Bottom Line.”7 
There is a growing recognition that the information presented in 
biomedical journal articles is distorted by these companies that fund the 
research and create financial relationships with the researchers as consultants 
or equity owners.8 The former editor-in-chief of a major biomedical journal 
writes that “the public trust in research has been eroded and there is a 
perception that professional fidelity and honesty on the part of investigators 
and clinicians has deteriorated.”9 More bluntly, the editor of The Lancet states, 
“Journals have devolved into information laundering operations for the 
pharmaceutical industry.”10 The judicial system has begun to notice. Judge 
Jack Weinstein writes, “The pervasive commercial bias found in today’s 
research laboratories means studies are often lacking in essential objectivity, 
with the potential for misinformation, skewed results, or cover-ups.”11 
Empirical evidence supports these conclusions. The drug and device 
industry is the single largest source of funding for biomedical research, both 
directly in its own research centers and indirectly through grants to academic 
investigators.12 In the United States, for example, industry funds about 
                                                   
5 Adriane Fugh-Berman & Douglas Melnick, Off-Label Promotion, On-Target Sales, 5 
PLoS Med. 1432, 1433 (2008). 
6 Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLoS Med. 364 (2005); see Dan Wikler, A Crisis in Medical 
Professionalism: Time for Flexner II, in Ethics and the Business of Biomedicine  249, 251 
(Denis G. Arnold ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) (compiling this and other sources cited 
below). 
7 Barton Moffatt & Carl Elliott, Ghost Marketing: Pharmaceutical Companies and 
Ghostwritten Journal Articles, 50 Persp. Biology & Med. 18, 19 (2007) (quoting a document 
that was produced in Motus v. Pfizer, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
8 See generally Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Bending Science: How 
Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research  (2008) (describing ways in which 
scientific processes are corrupted by special interests).  
9 Richard S. Irwin, The Role of Conflict of Interest in Reporting of Scientific Information , 
136 Chest 253, 254 (2009) (writing as the former editor-in-chief of the journal). 
10 Richard Horton, The Dawn of McScience, 51 N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 11, 2004, at 9. 
11 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, UFCW 
Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing on the question of 
causation). 
12 Dorsey et al., supra note 1, at 139; H. Moses III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical 
Research, 294 JAMA, 1333, 1333 (2005); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review , 289 JAMA 454, 
454 (2003); see also D. E. Zinner, Participation of Academic Scientists in Relationships with 
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seventy percent of the clinical trials of its drugs and devices. 13 And even when 
the industry is not funding the trial, its stockholders, consultants, officers, and 
directors are often conducting the study.14 As the federal government cuts 
budgets, the industry’s role as the primary benefactor of biomedical science is 
likely to grow.15  
The industry’s expenditure on this publication strategy seems to be a 
worthwhile investment. In a landmark review of the literature, an Institute of 
Medicine report concluded that: “Several systematic reviews and other studies 
provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry ties are more 
likely to have results that favor industry.”16 Indeed, one meta-study showed 
that industry-funded research is eight times less likely to reach unfavorable 
conclusions compared to independent studies. 17 Industry-sponsored studies 
can be biased in favor of the product being studied due to choice of design and 
methodologies, selective analysis and interpretation of data, and conclusory 
statements in the resulting journal abstracts and articles that might not be 
supported by the data. Indeed, there are no less than eighteen such 
opportunities for motivated investigators to consciously or subconsciously 
bias their research discussed below.18  
Admittedly, there may be benign explanations for some portion of the 
apparent biases. Perhaps industry-funded studies are more likely to reach 
favorable results simply because the industry is more conservative in deciding 
which studies it funds, compared to government and foundation funders who 
have the luxury of pursuing more conjectural hypotheses. 19 The industry’s 
                                                                                                                          
Industry, 28 Health Aff. 6, at 1814-25 (2009) (explaining further the financial conflicts of 
interest present in biomedical research). 
13 Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance—Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1539, 1539 (2000). 
14 Susannah L. Rose et al., Relationships Between Authorship Contributions and Authors’ 
Industry Financial Ties Among Oncology Clinical Trials , 28 J. Clinical Oncology 1316, 1316 
(2010).  
15 See Alex Wayne, GOP Budget Cuts Likely to Hurt Research, NIH Says, Wash. Post, 
Nov. 9, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/09/AR2010110906764.html.  
16 Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Conflict of Interest 
in Medical Research, Education, and Practice 104 (2009) [hereinafter IOM Report]; 
see also Su Golder & Yoon K. Loke, Is There Evidence for Biased Reporting of Published 
Adverse Effects Data in Pharmaceutical Industry-Funded Studies?, 66 Brit. J. Clinical 
Pharmacology 767, 767 (2008); Laurence Hirsch, Conflicts of Interest, Authorship, and 
Disclosures in Industry-Related Scientific Publications: The Tort Bar and Editorial Oversight 
of Medical Journals, 84 Mayo Clinic Proc. 811, 812 (2009) (discussing evidence that these 
discrepancies may be due to publication bias, i.e., the industry’s self-censoring of unfavorable 
results). 
17 Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses of New 
Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1455 (1999); see generally Joanna K. Sax, Protecting 
Scientific Integrity: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 Am. 
J.L. & Med. 203 (2011); see also J. E. Bekelman, Y. Li & C.P. Gross, Scope and Impact of 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review , 289 JAMA 454, 
454-65 (2003); Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research 
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 Brit. Med. J. 1167 (2003) (showing that, over 
the course of multiple studies, research funded by drug companies was more likely to have 
outcomes favoring the sponsor than studies with non-drug company sponsors). 
18 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
19 See Dorsey et al., supra note 1, at 141 (describing the industry’s “preference for 
[research] investments of lower risk”). 
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strategy could be conceived of as an efficient use of research dollars, or it may 
degrade into a company’s willful ignorance of unfavorable results, as they 
“decline[] to fund clinically important studies at least partly because the 
results might reduce sales of the drug.”20 The benign explanations can go only 
so far, because the evidence also shows that industry-funded studies are also 
biased towards being rather weak methodologically. A recent review of the 
methodological quality of 886 published studies in one field of medicine 
(orthopedics) found that “the level of evidence of industry-funded studies was 
lower than that for studies funded by governments, foundations, or 
universities.”21  
The problem is also one of trust. Even if all this industry money did not in 
reality create pernicious biases in science, it has clearly undermined the 
perceived legitimacy of this important institution.22 The flood of industry 
funding creates an appearance of impropriety, one that is leading towards a 
“systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise” in this context.23 A former 
editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) has 
lamented, “Physicians can no longer rely on the medical literature for valid 
and reliable information.”24 If physicians cannot rely on the medical literature, 
what are they doing instead? The very profession of medicine is at stake.  
Together then, we have evidence showing that industry funds a huge 
portion of biomedical science, that industry studies tend to be favorable to 
industry (a seeming bias in their conclusions), but that the studies are 
relatively weak methodologically (a seeming bias in their evidentiary 
strength). As a result, some physicians may careen towards complete 
skepticism of industry science, but the remainder who must proceed to 
practice in this flood of industry science will rely upon it. Such physicians will 
be swayed to use drugs or medical devices in contexts where they might not be 
effective, where they might present unnecessary risks to patients, or where 
they simply are not economical compared to treatment alternatives. Thus, as 
the industry succeeds in warping biomedical science to represent industry 
interests rather than physiological reality, it degrades the practice of 
medicine, harms patient welfare, and raids the treasuries of state and national 
governments.  
                                                   
20 See Bodenheimer, supra note 13 (describing an interview). 
21 Shahryar Noordin et al., Relationship Between Declared Funding Support and Level of 
Evidence, 92 J. Bone & Joint Surgery Am. 1647, 1647 (2010). But see Lexchin et al., supra 
note 17, at 1167 (finding that within the category of randomized controlled trials, that industry 
sponsored studies were no worse methodologically). 
22 For this distinction in another context, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 
2252, 2266 (2009), observing “[o]ne must also take into account the judicial reforms the 
States have implemented to eliminate even the appearance of partiality.”  
23 Christopher T. Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 178 n.11 (2010) 
(quoting John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
823, 836 (1985)). 
24 Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA 
1069, 1070-71 (2008). Angell goes on to say: “It is self-evidently absurd to look to investor-
owned companies for unbiased evaluations  of their own products. Yet many academic 
investigators and their  institutions pretend otherwise, and it is convenient and profitable  for 
them to do so.” Id. 
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B. The Failure of Status Quo Solutions  
What can be done to reduce the potential corrupting influence of industry 
money in biomedical research? Current regulatory mechanisms include 
litigation, peer review, and mandatory disclosure. This section explains why 
they fail to solve the problem.    
1. Litigation 
To date, except for ex post reactions in the most egregious cases, the law 
has been largely silent with respect to the problem of biased science.25 In 
theory, if the industry’s manipulation of science rose to the level of outright 
fraud, a plaintiff could recover under state tort laws, the federal qui tam act, 
and federal racketeering statutes—assuming that the plaintiff had standing 
and that he or she could prove causation of a specific injury. Except in the 
most egregious cases, these barriers are nearly insurmountable.26  
When drug- and device-makers promote their products beyond the uses 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), such violations can 
lead to Department of Justice enforcement actions and seemingly-large 
settlements.27 Such lawsuits do not, however, reach the fundamental problem 
of biased science, but instead focus on the downstream problems that arise 
when companies go too far in promoting their products. 
There are also more creative theories available for litigators. In the recent 
case of Merck v. Reynolds, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case involving a 
securities fraud class action against the manufacturer of rofecoxib (Vioxx), an 
anti-inflammatory drug approved to treat arthritis pain.28 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the company had made various misrepresentations about the 
drug in order to inflate its stock price, including a March 2000 study 
supported by the company and published in the NEJM. The data showed a 
four-fold increased risk of adverse cardiovascular events with Vioxx over 
naproxen, but the industry-affiliated authors put the finding on its head. The 
authors wrote that the adverse event rate “was significantly lower in the 
naproxen group than in the rofecoxib group (0.1 to 0.4),”29 a statement that 
                                                   
25 Section 801 of the Food and Drug Administration Act of 2007 does require researchers 
to register interventional clinical trials and, for marketed products, to disclose the results of 
such trials within twelve months after study completion, on www.clinicaltrials.gov. See Food 
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Following several state laws, as of 2013, federal law 
will also require the industry to disclose its financial relationships with physicians, though 
there are questions about the completeness and accuracy of such disclosures. See Charles 
Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Drug Companies’ Reports Aren’t Always Accurate, Star-Trib., Dec 
12, 2010, available at http://www.startribune.com/business/111704609.html (discussing an 
analysis of Minnesota’s required disclosures).   
26 See, e.g., UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
even if plaintiff could prove misrepresentations, it would be unable to prove a causal effect on 
the prices paid for drugs).  
27 See Aaron Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health 
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 225, 241 tbl.1 (2011) (reviewing DOJ 
enforcement actions). 
28 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).  
29 Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib 
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 New Eng. J. Med. 1520, 1526 
(2000). 
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implies that the difference was due to a cardioprotective effect of naproxen 
rather than a toxic effect of Vioxx. In addition, the investigators had 
predetermined an endpoint for the study, and it was later revealed that 
additional post-endpoint cardiovascular adverse events occurred in Vioxx-
treated patients in that trial, but these results were not included in the 
published article.30 After the publication of this and other similarly-biased 
trials, annual sales of Vioxx reached billions of dollars, but the drug was later 
removed from the market due to concerns over its cardiovascular safety. The 
plaintiff stockholders argued in the securities fraud case that the biased 
biomedical journal articles misrepresented the safety of the product, and thus 
the financial security of the company. After a win for the plaintiffs in the 
Supreme Court on a preliminary procedural issue, this case remains 
pending.31  
Thus, the pharmaceutical and medical device industries may face 
potential liability in the extreme cases that rise to outright fraud, but only on 
the rare occasion that it can be detected by plaintiffs, proven in ex post 
litigation, and where causation of a specific and tangible harm can be 
demonstrated. The concern here, on the other hand, is about a ubiquitous 
industry influence on biomedical science, a biasing pressure that is strong 
enough to change prescribing and consumer behavior, but not so blatant as to 
be prosecuted as outright fraud. That sort of manipulation appears to enjoy 
something near legal impunity.   
2. Peer Review 
The biomedical journals utilize a peer review process to police the 
methodological rigor of biomedical journal articles, and thus may be a 
bulwark against industry efforts to manipulate biomedical science. Biomedical 
journal editors have two primary tools in their arsenal: peer review and 
disclosure.32 Peer review is in one sense an extreme form of non-governmental 
regulation, not unlike censorship, saying to rejected authors, “you cannot say 
that here.”33 Thus, peer review is in theory a strong bulwark against the 
industry’s ability to manipulate science.34  
Still, peer review focuses merely on the methods and data reported in the 
text of journal article drafts, and only indirectly addresses industry influence 
in a long chain of decisions that produce those drafts.35 And, unlike a grant 
                                                   
30 Gregory D. Curfman et al., Editorial, Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al., 
Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 2813, 2813-14 (2005). 
31 See Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784. 
32 There are also a variety of less prominent interventions. JAMA, for example, requires 
independent statistical analysis of industry-sponsored studies. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 
813 (discussing this policy and the backlash against it). 
33 See Arturo Casadevall & Ferric C. Fang, Editorial, 77 Infection & Immunity 1273 
(2009) (editor-in-chief of the journal, weighing the argument that peer review is censorship).  
34 See Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 8 
JAMA 996, at 996-98 (2006) (arguing that certain studies were valid because they survived 
peer review, even though there were improprieties in the process of disclosing financial 
relationships with industry).  
35 Peer reviewers are often not provided with the authors’ financial disclosures. See 
Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Reporting Financial Conflicts of Interest and 
Relationships Between Investigators and Research Sponsors , 286 JAMA 89, 90 (2001). This 
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funding agency or an Institutional Review Board, the peer reviewers must 
assess the methodological rigor of the submitted articles after the studies have 
been designed and the research has been completed. Peer reviewers’ choices 
are limited to accepting an article (with or without textual revisions) or 
rejecting an article (which effectively demotes it to another journal, which will 
then have the opportunity to publish the groundbreaking results, 
notwithstanding the limitations).  
Thus, peer reviewers’ decisions are necessarily pragmatic and 
comparative—weighing the clinical significance of the findings against the 
study’s apparent methodological rigor, and asking whether there is likely to be 
a more significant or more rigorous article in the queue to fill the journal’s 
pages instead. To the extent that industry-influenced studies dominate the 
medical literature, they define the range of alternative articles and thus set 
their own benchmarks for methodological rigor.  
Some have argued that peer review is “slow, expensive[,] . . . something of 
a lottery, prone to bias[,] . . . easily abused,” and hopeless at spotting errors 
and fraud.36 Without wading into the details of that debate, for our purposes 
the results speak for themselves; the foregoing evidence showing that 
industry-funded studies tend to be biased and methodologically weak are 
based on publications in peer-reviewed journals.37 Thus, while one could 
speculate about how much worse the situation would be without peer review, 
it remains clear that peer review is not a complete solution. 
3. Mandatory Disclosure 
Another potential remedy is for biomedical journal editors to require 
authors to disclose industry funding and investigators’ related financial 
interests. In theory, readers of biomedical journal article abstracts (i.e., 
physicians, payors, and regulators) would use disclosures of the authors’ 
relationships with industry to calibrate their reliance on the abstracts they 
read.38  
It is worthwhile to understand how this reliance-calibration mechanism is 
supposed to work in practice. Suppose that a physician is deciding whether to 
prescribe a certain drug for a given disease that is not listed on the label. 39 
Since the FDA has not determined whether the drug is in fact safe and 
effective for the off-label indication, the physician must make her own 
                                                                                                                          
policy is apparently intended to preserve the anonymity of the authors, so that the reviewers 
do not succumb to personal biases, pro or con. Some journals are moving towards a single-
blind review, in part to allow reviewers to assess conflicts of interests.  
36 Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals , 99 
J. Royal Soc’y Med. 178, 179 (2006). 
37 See sources cited supra Part I.B.1. 
38 The Supreme Court tells a similar story in the context of mandatory disclosures for 
political campaign finance. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (asserting that a 
disclosure mandate “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight 
to different speakers and messages”). But see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About 
Disclosure, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 255 (2010) (drawing on psychological literature to criticize this 
assumption as being too simplistic). 
39 Such “off-label” prescribing is quite common and is perfectly legal; physicians can 
prescribe a drug for any indication as long as the drug has been approved for one indication. 
See generally Kesselheim, supra note 27. 
366  AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE  VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011 
epistemic assessment.40 The physician knows that the chance that any random 
chemical would be useful for alleviating a given disease is quite low, and the 
physician has no particular physiological theory that would predict that this 
drug would be effective in treating the given disease. Nonetheless, the 
physician has heard anecdotes that patients with the disease have improved 
after receiving the drug. So all this information could form the basis for a 
Bayesian prior of non-effectiveness. She might conclude that there is a 0.1 
probability of the drug being effective for the given disease.41  
Now, if the physician were then presented with a scientific research study 
funded by the National Institutes of Health showing that the drug is effective 
for the given disease, she might then update her prior belief and now conclude 
that the probability of efficacy is greater than 0.5. Perhaps she would then 
prescribe the drug.42 On the other hand, suppose that a disclosure mandate 
instead revealed that the second study was funded by the company that makes 
the drug. Such a disclosure would presumably reduce the epistemic value of 
that second study (if the physician assumed that such industry-sponsored 
studies were generally less reliable). The physician with this disclosure might 
then hew closer to his or her original assessment, and thus perhaps adopt a 
revised assessment of only 0.2 probability of efficacy, still not enough to 
prescribe the drug off-label. In this context, a disclosure mandate may have a 
causal impact, one that protects the professional discretion of physicians from 
industry-biased science.43  
That is the theory. In practice, the value of disclosures is quite limited. 
First, this discounting dynamic presumes that the physician has internalized 
the corollary assumption that industry-funded studies tend to be biased 
towards industry products.44 Some experimental research supports the 
assumption that physicians tend to maintain some skepticism about industry-
funded studies. In one study, readers of a biomedical journal article that 
included disclosures of conflicting interests found such articles “significantly 
less interesting, important, relevant, valid, and believable” compared to the 
reactions of readers who saw the same article with no disclosed conflicts.45 
Even then, it is hard to know if physicians will discount too much or too little.  
                                                   
40 Even with FDA approval of an on-label prescription, physicians still must make 
epistemic assessments when there are multiple competing treatment options, or where there 
are significant risks of side-effects, or generally if there is a risk that the FDA’s assessment may 
be unreliable. 
41 See generally Joshua B. Tennenbaum et al., Theory-Based Bayesian Models of Inductive 
Learning and Reasoning, 10 Trends Cognitive Sci. 309 (2006) (describing Bayesian 
reasoning). 
42 We are simply assuming, for the sake of argument, that a 0.5 estimate of the likelihood 
of efficacy is the threshold for a doctor prescribing the drug off-label. In reality, the threshold 
could be higher or lower, given the risks, costs, and benefits of the drug compared to 
alternative courses of treatment. 
43 See Christopher T. Robertson, Biased Advice, Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (an 
experimental study showing that disclosures of conflicting interests only helped laypersons 
when laypersons also had access to unconflicted advice). 
44 See sources cited supra notes 16-21. 
45 Samena Chaudhry et al., Does Declaration of Competing Interests Affect Readers’ 
Perceptions? A Randomised Trial, 325 Brit. Med. J. 1391, 1392 (2002); see also Sara Schroter 
et al., Does the Type of Competing Interest Statement Affect Readers’ Perceptions of the 
Credibility of Research? Randomised Trial, 328 Brit. Med. J. 742 (2004) (finding similar 
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Still, a primary problem with disclosure as a remedy for industry influence 
in science is that the consumers of biomedical journal articles often have little 
or no alternative sources of information.46 To put it another way, physicians 
often find themselves in clinical situations in which they have very weak 
priors. If a physician has no information about the efficacy of a given chemical 
compound for treating a disease, then even the most highly-conflicted 
research study showing efficacy may push the physician over the threshold to 
begin prescribing the drug. An industry-funded study is better than no study 
at all. In such contexts of high epistemic uncertainty, a disclosure mandate 
would seem to have no causal impact.  
Indeed, in a recent experimental study, physicians reviewed a biomedical 
journal abstract purporting to prove the efficacy of a new chemical compound, 
and were randomized into conditions with and without disclosed industry 
funding.47 Although the physicians said that they generally would find 
industry-funded studies to be less persuasive, in fact they reported roughly 
equal likelihoods of prescribing the new drug, regardless of whether they were 
in the industry-funded or NIH-funded condition. The disclosure of industry 
funding made absolutely no causal difference.48 This study suggests that if 
industry is successfully biasing science, then the physicians relying on those 
studies are being biased in their prescribing decisions. Even with disclosure 
and peer review, bad science is translating into bad medicine.  
The foregoing study tested a clear and concise disclosure appended to a 
biomedical journal abstract. The situation is even worse in practice. Many of 
the most reputable biomedical journals now require authors to disclose to the 
editors their related financial interests, but journals vary widely in their 
practices as to what information is provided to the journals’ own reviewers 
and physician readers, who rely on the journal articles to inform their clinical 
decision-making.49 Many journals disclose to readers very rudimentary 
information about the authors’ personal financial relationships (e.g., “Dr. X is 
a consultant for Pfizer”), but do not provide any details or sense of scale, 
                                                                                                                          
results with multiple papers and testing both stock ownership and research grants 
disclosures). 
46 See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Conflicts of Interest, 329 New Eng. J. Med. 
573, 575 (1993) (arguing that “[a] deficiency of disclosure is that those  who receive the 
information may not know how to interpret it and may not in any case have reasonable 
alternative courses of action in the circumstances”); see also Kevin A. Kerber & A. Mark 
Fendrick, The Evidence Base for the Evaluation and Management of Dizziness, 16 J. 
Evaluation Clinical Pract. 186, 189 (2010) (concluding that “[p]hysicians rely on the 
medical literature to inform decisions, but our study suggests that the evidence base for 
dizziness evaluation and management is weak”); see generally David M. Eddy, Variations in 
Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 Health Aff. 74 (1984) (arguing that the 
practice of medicine is permeated by profound uncertainty about the comparative effectiveness 
of treatment options). 
47 Gabriel K. Silverman et al., Failure to Discount for Conflict of Interest When Evaluating 
Medical Literature: A Randomised Trial of Physicians, 36 J. Med. Ethics 265, 265-70 (2010). 
48 See also Adam Licurse et al., The Impact of Disclosing Financial Ties in Research and 
Clinical Care: A Systematic Review, 170 Archives Internal Med. 675, 681 (2010) (providing 
a literature review and concluding that “these disclosures appear to have a limited effect on 
behavioral outcomes”); Bonnie E. Glaser & Lisa A. Bero, Attitudes of Academic and Clinical 
Researchers Toward Financial Ties in Research: A Systematic Review , 11 Sci. & Engineering 
Ethics 553 (2005) (also reviewing this literature). 
49 See generally Jared A. Blum et al., Requirements and Definitions in Conflict of Interest 
Policies of Medical Journals, 302 JAMA 2230 (2009).  
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lumping a $500 honorarium with a $1,000,000 equity interest. Recently, 
there has been a push to increase the amount of disclosures that medical 
journals provide to readers.50 Researchers have also found rampant 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in disclosure policies and practices. 51 Even 
worse, many readers do not even see those disclosures. Physicians commonly 
choose to read only the abstracts of biomedical journal articles, syndicated 
through services such as PubMed. Such abstracts usually do not include any 
disclosures. When journals do provide such disclosures to readers, they 
instead tend to do so in a long box located at the end of the article, which 
physicians may not notice or read, and which may provide little real guidance 
as to the significance or relevance of the disclosures.52   
Too often, these abstracts inaccurately report the conclusions of the 
underlying articles.53 Biomedical journal abstracts also usually include very 
little discussion of the limitations of the study, and physicians may fail to 
appreciate the statistical and methodological limitations, even when disclosed 
in technical terms.54 Furthermore, psychological studies suggest that 
physicians likely are influenced by their initial reading of the abstract even 
when they do continue to read the full article, where they might find the 
discussion of limitations and disclosures of conflicting interests.55 Thus, it 
seems quite unlikely that current or even foreseeable disclosure policies 
suffice to solve the problem of biased science.56  
                                                   
50 Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Uniform Format for Disclosure of Competing Interests in 
ICMJE Journals, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 1896, 1896 (2009). 
51 Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Consistency of Financial Interest Disclosures in the Biomedical 
Literature: The Case of Coronary Stents, PloS ONE, May 7, 2008, available at 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0002128. 
52 See IOM Report, supra note 16, at 77. 
53 Roy M. Pitkin et al., Accuracy of Data in Abstracts of Published Research Articles, 281 
JAMA 1110, 1110-11 (1999) (finding that 18-68% of abstracts (varying by journal) include 
findings “that are inconsistent with or absent from the article’s body . . . even in large -
circulation general medical journals”).  There is a debate about what information should be 
included in biomedical abstracts, and how they can be made more accurate. See generally Ad 
Hoc Working Group for Critical Appraisal of the Medical Literature,  A Proposal for More 
Informative Abstracts of Clinical Articles, 106 Annals Internal Med. 598, 598-604 (1987).  
54 See Scott T. Weiss & Jonathan M. Samet, An Assessment of Physician Knowledge of 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 55 J. Med. Educ. 692, 697 (1980) (“[P]hysicians may not be 
prepared adequately to evaluate medical literature”); Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates 
in Medical Care, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 527, 537 (2006) (discussing physicians’ difficulties with 
statistical reasoning). 
55 Sally Hopewell, Better Reporting of Randomized Trials in Biomedical Journal and 
Conference Abstracts, 34 J. Info. Sci. 173 (2008) (suggesting that physicians form their first 
impressions of articles based on the abstracts); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing research 
on the anchoring effect). 
56 For other research suggesting disclosure policies, see Mark A. Rodwin,  Physicians’ 
Conflicts of Interest: the Limitations of Disclosure, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 1405, 1405-08 
(1989); Baruch A. Brody et al., Expanding Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest: The Views of 
Stakeholders, 25 IRB: Ethics & Hum. Res. 1, 1-8 (2003); Roger S. Foster, Conflicts of Interest: 
Recognition, Disclosure, and Management, 196 J. Am. Coll. Surgeons 505, 505-15 (2003); 
Michael S. Jellinek, IRBs and Pharmaceutical Company Funding of Research , 4 IRB: Ethics 
& Hum. Res. 9 (1982); Ron Roizen, Why I Oppose Drug Company Payment of 
Physician/Investigators on a Per Patient/Subject Basis , 10 IRB: Ethics & Hum. Res. 9, 9-10 
(1988); Howard M. Spiro, Mammon and Medicine: The Rewards of Clinical Trials , 255 JAMA 
1174, 1174 (1986); Heidi P. Forster et al., The 2000 Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: A 
Step Forward or More Confusion?, 358 Lancet 1449, 1449-53 (2001); and Kenneth J. 
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It should be noted that mandatory disclosure of conflicting interests does 
not even purport to prevent science from being biased. It is a downstream 
remedy, one that attempts to break the chain between biased science and 
biased medicine. In fact, some experimental research suggests that disclosure 
mandates may actually exacerbate the biases in science.57 Daylian Cain and 
colleagues constructed an estimation task and assigned human subjects to the 
roles of “estimators” and “advisors,” and then manipulated whether the 
advisors had conflicting interests, and, if so, whether they would be 
mandatorily disclosed to the estimators. One might hypothesize that a 
disclosure mandate would cause conflicted advisors to be more self-aware and 
less strident in their biases, but it instead did the opposite. The mandatory 
disclosure policy apparently created a sense of moral license, or caveat 
emptor, such that the advisors who were forced to disclose their conflicts gave 
advice that was even more biased than those who had no such disclosure 
mandate.58 If a similar dynamic is at work in biomedical science, then 
disclosures are not just useless; they are deleterious. 
II. RE-CONCEIVING THE PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION  
A. The Root Causes of Biased Science 
Any real solution to biased science must address the source of the 
problem. How does industry-funded science become biased?  
First, the company chooses the investigator that it wishes to support. In 
the most egregious cases, the company actually performs the research in its 
own labs or through a contract organization. Then the company “ghost-writes” 
the article, and thereafter recruits reputable scholars to put their names on 
the publication to give it a patina of objectivity.59 For example, in one of the 
Vioxx papers discussed above, first author Jeffrey Lisse said in an interview 
that “Merck designed the trial, paid for the trial, ran the trial . . .  [.] Merck 
came to me after the study was completed and said, ‘We want your help to 
work on the paper.’ The initial paper was written at Merck, and then it was 
sent to me for editing.”60  
In recent years, there have been efforts to crack down on the worst abuses 
of ghost-writing, but it is simply the tip of the iceberg because the industry 
still provides the vast majority of funding for research, and thus can hand-pick 
which researchers it wishes to support. With many aspiring scholars, each 
                                                                                                                          
Rothman, Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science, 269 JAMA 2782, 2782-84 
(1993). 
57 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean: 
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. Legal Stud. 1, 18 (2005); see also 
Ming Li & Kristóf Madarász, When Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Expert Advice and 
Conflicting Interests, 139 J. Econ. Theory 47, 48–50, 60, 62–63 (2008). 
58 This dynamic is similar to that documented by behavioral researchers in which 
imposition of a fine for a given behavior actually caused the frequency of that behavior to 
increase. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000). 
59 See generally Moffatt & Elliott, supra note 7. 
60 Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped 
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLoS Med. 1429, 1429 (2007) (quoting 
Alex Berenson, Evidence in Vioxx Suits Shows Intervention by Merck Officials , N.Y. Times 
Apr. 24, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/24/business/24drug.html).  
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trying to move up in academia or in a contract research organization, it is not 
hard for a company to find a research team that will produce favorable results. 
As one scholar, John Ioannidis, comments, “There is an intellectual conflict of 
interest that pressures researchers to find whatever it is that is most likely to 
get them funded.”61 As another scholar has written, investigators “with a 
reputation for producing favorable results for drug companies’ products are 
likely to flourish, while those with more scrupulous standards are likely to go 
out of business.”62 If a researcher benefits from such a corporate largesse but 
refuses to produce favorable results, he is unlikely to be so favored again. This 
is the tyranny of the second grant.  
And there is no shortage of opportunities for the funded scholar to do the 
bidding of his corporate sponsor, even if unintentionally. The investigator 
makes dozens of discretionary decisions, each one presenting an opportunity 
to raise or lower the bar for the company’s product. Here are a few questions 
that the investigator must answer in designing, conducting, and analyzing the 
study: 
 Whom will I select as collaborators? 
 What will be our primary outcome variables (endpoints or 
proxies)?  
 What scale will we use to measure them?  
 What data will we collect for potentially confounding variables?  
 What dosage will we use for the experimental product?  
 What products will we use as controls, for placebo, or standard of 
care comparisons?  
 What dosage will we use for the controls?  
 Which population are we going to study?  
 How large will our sample be?  
 What will be the inclusion and exclusion criteria for our sample, 
both initially and as the study proceeds?  
 Whom will we recruit as raters?  
 When will we stop the study?  
 What statistical methods will we employ?  
 How many different hypotheses will we test in our dataset, and will 
these multiple tests be disclosed in the final paper? 
 Should we publish any of our findings at all? 
 Which conclusions will we report?  
 How will we characterize our findings verbally?  
 Which findings will we emphasize in the abstract, and which will 
we bury in the back?  
“At every step of the process, there is room to distort results, a way to 
make a stronger claim, or to select what is going to be concluded.” 63 One need 
                                                   
61 David H. Freeman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Science, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 
2010, at 80, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/lies-
damned-lies-and-medical-science/8269/ (quoting John Ioannidis). 
62 Arthur Schafer, Biomedical Conflicts Of Interest: A Defence of the Sequestration Thesis – 
Learning From the Cases of Nancy Olivieri and David Healey, 30 J. Med. Ethics 8, 23 
(2004).  
63 Id. In a provocative article, Ioannidis offers a mathematical model that demonstrates 
that because of these rampant commercial and other biases, and the many opportunities to 
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not assume that all industry-funded scholars are nefarious cretins; a raft of 
behavioral research in recent decades has shown that such “observer effects,” 
“optimism biases,” and other heuristics can distort decisions even when a 
person has every intention and every incentive to be accurate.64 
B. Money-Blinding as a Solution to the Root Causes  
Science requires the exercise of professional discretion. There simply is no 
way to eliminate the exercise of scientists’ professional discretion in designing 
and conducting research studies, and there would seem to be no way to 
monitor or modify those decisions as they are made.  
And science requires money. Lots of it. Unless there is a gigantic influx of 
money from the government or non-commercial interests, industry funding of 
biomedical science is inevitable and, admittedly, desirable.65 As Leo Goldman 
explains, “[C]ompanies translate biologic advances into useable products for 
patients. They do it for a profit motive, but they do it, and it needs to be 
done.”66  
This combination of professional discretion and industry money together 
creates the problem of scientific bias, and harms the perceived legitimacy of 
science. Still, there are institutional solutions available, ones that should seem 
familiar to scholars, editors, and policymakers, because they borrow from 
current practices in related contexts. For decades, journal editors have 
insisted that whenever possible, biomedical research should be blinded. 
Indeed, “any process using a human as a perceptor, rater, or interpreter  
should be ‘as blind as possible for as long as possible.’”67 The randomized, 
controlled “double-blind” study has become the scientific “gold standard.”68 
                                                                                                                          
express them, “most claimed research findings are false.” John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most 
Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS Med. 0696, 0696 (2005); see also David L. 
Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 51, 51-63 (1979) (describing some 
of these sources of bias); Lisa A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of 
Published Drug Studies, 12 Int’l J. Tech. Assess. Health Care 209,  209-37 (1996) (also 
describing some sources of bias). 
64 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 185-88 (reviewing some of this literature); D. Michael 
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: 
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion , 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2002) (reviewing the 
behavioral research literature). 
65 Many commentators opine that an outright ban on industry funding and a replacement 
with tax dollars is the only viable solution. See, e.g., Schafer, supra note 62, at 23 (“If the 
community values public science in the public interest then it will have to be paid for by public 
tax dollars.”). But see William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning 
“Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research , 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1413, 1448–49 (2007) (arguing for more direct regulation of privately funded biomedical 
research).  
66 Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 1543.  
67 Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Our Numbers Wrong?, 33 Am. Psychologist 1005, 
1007 (1978); see generally D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A 
Glass Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 Jurimetrics J. 21 (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437276 (discussing similar problems and 
potential solutions in the forensic science field). 
68 See TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 
that the double-blind study is the gold standard in medicine); Grade Working Group, Grading 
Quality of Evidence and Strength of Recommendations , 328 Brit. Med. J. 1, 2 (2004) 
(explaining that reviewers assessing the quality of a study “may state that failure to blind 
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The requirement of randomization first effectively blinds the investigator in 
the selection process, preventing her from handpicking favorable subjects for 
the treatment condition versus the control condition. A double-blind study is 
one in which the human subjects are unaware of whether they are receiving a 
placebo or the studied intervention, and where the clinicians actually 
assessing the outcomes are also unaware of which subjects are in the “control” 
and the “treatment” conditions.69 Biomedical journal editors, peer reviewers, 
and readers now expect blinding to be employed wherever feasible. 70  
These blinds do nothing for the eighteen opportunities to exercise biased 
discretion enumerated above. What is needed, then, is a more robust blind 
that covers all these other discretionary decisions. In short, companies should 
be allowed to fund studies by competent investigators who provide financial 
and scientific accountability, but companies should be blinded to the selection 
of investigators, just as investigators are blinded to the selection of  human 
subjects. Companies should not be allowed to handpick the investigators who 
are most likely to run favorable studies, nor implicitly condition future 
funding on favorable performance by those investigators. Although companies 
should be free to tie their money to specific products and hypotheses, 
companies should not also be allowed to unduly influence the design or 
conduct of the scientific studies that they fund. This method for reducing 
industry influence could be called a “money blind.”71  
Other scholars have, in passing, suggested such a reform, but it remains to 
be seen whether the concept is practicable and legally viable.72 Such a money 
                                                                                                                          
patients and physicians reduced the quality of evidence for an intervention’s impact on pain 
severity and that they considered this a serious limitation”).  
69 See David P. Byar et al., Design Considerations for AIDS Trials, 323 New Eng. J. Med. 
1343, 1345 (1990) (“Blinding is especially desirable when subjective end points, such as pain, 
functional status, or quality of life, are studied, because such evaluations are open to 
substantial bias.”). 
70 In some contexts, it is simply not feasible to require single or double blinding. For 
example, in the testing of surgical techniques or medical devices, both the surgeon and the 
patient may need to know what is being done. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: 
Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community , 44 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 373, 391 (2002) (describing these limits). 
71 Alternatively, following on the “double blind” model, this method could be called a 
“triple blind.” Alas, the term has already been deployed for other purposes. Triple Blind, 
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary for Health Consumers (2007), available at 
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/triple+blind (defining “triple blind” as 
“pertaining to clinical trial other experiment in which neither the subject nor the person 
administering the treatment nor the person evaluating the response to treatment knows which 
subjects are receiving a particular treatment or lack of treatment”).  
72 Dennis Thompson has suggested that blinding could be employed in the medical 
context to solve conflict of interest problems. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 575 (“Because 
of the limitations of disclosure, more stringent methods of enforcement deserve consideration, 
especially in cases of more severe kinds of conflict of interest. Other methods (roughly in order 
of increasing stringency) include mediation (devices such as blind trusts that insulate the 
physician from the secondary interest) . . . .”). Sheldon Krimsky has called for the 
establishment of a new National Institute for Drug Testing (NIDT), which would receive 
industry funds but then itself organize the clinical trial. Sheldon Krimsky, Science in the 
Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research? 229 
(2003). Arthur Schafer has suggested that, “One practical possibility might be to require of 
any drug company which desires to bring a new drug to market that it provide to an 
independent institute all the funding necessary for the design and performance of a clinical 
trial of its drug. The institute would then allocate to qualified university and hospital 
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blind would require an intermediary agency between the funder and the 
investigator.73 The funder would provide to the intermediary the product for 
testing and designate a testable hypothesis (i.e., that the product will be safe 
and/or effective for some specified clinical indication). The intermediary 
would then determine how much money would be necessary to properly test 
that hypothesis, and require such payment in advance.74 The funder will 
demand assurances that the investigators will be competent and that the 
funds will be managed reasonably. The intermediary would then select an 
investigator, disburse the money, oversee design of the study, and provide 
financial accountability.75 
Such an intermediary would have its own overhead costs that would need 
to be recouped, presumably from the funders. However, the funders are 
already performing the tasks of selecting investigators and overseeing their 
research, so there might be little net increase in expense. To the extent that 
NIH investigators enjoy more autonomy from the funder, and could develop 
an economy of scale, the oversight costs actually might be less.  
In principle, a for-profit, non-profit, or governmental agency could be 
created to serve as the intermediary. However, the NIH would seem to be the 
natural candidate for this role, since it already has developed significant 
institutional legitimacy and the expertise to review approximately 65,000 
grant applications per year, from which it distributes 14,600 grants totaling 
$5.66 billion in awards per year.76 The NIH could thus deploy its current 
procedures and infrastructure to disburse the industry money, alongside the 
                                                                                                                          
researchers the task of conducting the necessary clinical trials.” Schafer, supra note 62, at 23. 
See also Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Pharmaceutical Industry: How They 
Deceive Us and What to Do About It  245 (2004) (calling for an independent drug 
evaluation agency within the NIH). 
73 Some scholars have suggested that academic medical centers could act as an 
intermediary of sorts for unrestricted grants. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry 
Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 
295 JAMA 429, 432 (2006) (“To promote scientific progress, [Academic Medical Centers] 
should be able to accept grants for general support of research (no specific deliverable 
products) from pharmaceutical and device companies, provided that the grants are not 
designated for use by specific individuals. As long as the institution stands between the 
individual investigator and the company making the grant, the likelihood of undue influence is 
minimized but certainly not eliminated”); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 1543 (“Some 
investigators interviewed for this article felt that drug trials should be funded by industry but 
that design, implementation, data analysis, and publication should be controlled entirely by 
academic medical centers and investigators.”). 
74 In practice, some professional judgment will be required to assess whether the funder’s 
stipulations are reasonable, or whether they are instead attempts to bias the design of the 
study. For example, if a study is designed to explore safety, then severely underfunding the 
study could cause the resulting study to be underpowered, which would then increase the odds 
of falsely affirming the null hypothesis that there are no side effects.  
75 Alternatively, an investigator may conceive of a hypothesis and experiment to test some 
product and then seek funding from the intermediary. If the intermediary finds the proposal 
promising, it could then request support from the company. The company could then agree to 
disburse the funds to the intermediary, without knowing the identity of the researcher or the 
particular research design. 
76 Nat’l Inst. of Health, Research Project Grants & Other Mechanisms: Competing 
Applications, Awards, Success Rates, and Total Funding Made with Direct Authority and 
Superfund Funds, by NIH Institutes/Center, Grant Mechanisms, and Activity Codes , NIH Res. 
Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://report.nih.gov/FileLink.aspx?rid=601. 
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federal government money. The NIH already works in 229 different disease 
areas, which suggests that it would have expertise to select and oversee 
investigators in virtually any area that industry would seek to fund research. 77 
The NIH also appears to be quite selective in assessing investigators and 
research protocols. In 2010, the NIH approved only twenty-three percent of 
the grant applications it received.78 Under NIH policies, grant reviewers must 
evaluate all aspects of a prospective research project, including “the 
competency of the proposed staff in relation to the type of research 
involved.”79 Federal courts reviewing aspects of these protocols have found 
them “reasonable and fair.”80 Given the NIH’s longstanding expertise, the 
drug and device industry should have some confidence that their money will 
be spent appropriately. 
For clinical trials that will become the basis of an application to the FDA, 
it may instead be more sensible for the FDA to itself serve as the intermediary, 
if one is needed at all.81 Intermediary services may be less critical in this 
context, since the FDA already consults closely with the industry in design and 
implementation of such studies, and thus may be able to police bias in a way 
that ex post peer reviewers cannot.82  
The money blind would be applicable to double-blind randomized 
controlled trials, as well as other sorts of biomedical research.83 Single-blind 
experiments, open-label experiments, retrospective cohort studies, and other 
observational studies all have a role in the literature, but they provide even 
more opportunities for the investigators to be biased. Even if it is not feasible 
to use double-blind randomized control methods for a given question, it 
would still be feasible to impose a blinding intermediary to create some 
distance between the industry funder and the investigator. Although this 
proposal is focused directly on industry funding of studies, this is admittedly 
not the only vector of potential industry influence. Companies also create 
relationships directly with investigators, including consultancies and grants to 
their academic institutions, which may curry favor. Even with a money blind 
in place, the companies may be able to identify the most likely recipients of 
funds and co-opt them with side payments or other forms of influence. When 
                                                   
77 Nat’l Inst. of Health, Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and 
Disease Categories (RCDC), NIH Res. Portfolio Online Reporting Tools, 
http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/ (table data as of Mar. 15, 2011).  
78 See Nat’l Inst. of Health, supra note 76 (reporting 14,600 grants distributed out of 
65,000 grant applications in 2010). 
79 HHS Evaluation and Disposition of Applications, 42 C.F.R. § 52.5(b) (2010).  
80 Grassetti v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 142, 151 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
81 The FDA, however, has greater risks of regulatory capture, see infra note 92, and may 
be inadequately staffed to take on these responsibilities. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, Food and Drug Administration: FDA Faces Challenges Meeting its Growing 
Medical Product Responsibilities and Should Develop Complete Estimates of Its 
Resource Needs 16 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09581.pdf. 
82 See, e.g., Early Consultation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2010) (encouraging drug makers to 
work with regulators “to review and reach agreement on the design” of studies before they are 
carried out). 
83 In 2009, a review of the literature that the FDA used to approve cardiovascular devices 
found that although almost all the studies were industry-funded, they were extremely weak 
methodologically, and only nine percent of them were double-blinded. Sanket S. Dhruva et al., 
Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular 
Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2682 tbl.1 (2009). 
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these investigators then apply for and receive funding through the 
intermediary, they would be just as biased as if they had received it directly 
from the company. 
When selecting investigators, the NIH should demand full disclosures of 
such relationships, just as it already reviews conflicts of interest. Using 
disclosures prospectively, to choose between potential researchers, avoids 
some of the problems with putting disclosures on journal articles, after the 
research is done.84 All other things being equal, the intermediary should 
award grants to researchers that have the fewest such relationships, and that 
preference should create an incentive for competing investigators to avoid 
such relationships.   
Still, one might worry that the investigators who have the closest 
relationships with industry will also have the greatest expertise in testing the 
drug, creating a Gordian knot for the intermediary.    
On the other hand, it may be that much of the research that is now 
conducted by investigators closely affiliated with industry could instead be 
conducted by others who absolutely reject such relationships. After all, science 
has two different functions—the generation of novel hypotheses and the 
testing of those hypotheses.85 Perhaps the top scholars in the field must 
necessarily have relationships with industry to advise and assist them in 
generating novel compounds and groundbreaking hypotheses. But it is not 
clear why those persons also need to be the ones testing those hypotheses, 
conducting the mundane and routine tests of efficacy and safety. After all, a 
well-run experiment is more about mechanical adherence to a protocol, 
methodical record keeping, complete transparency, financial accountability, 
and logistical management of thousands of patients at potentially a dozen 
research centers.86 Thus, when the intermediary weighs proposals by research 
teams, it may perform an initial screen to eliminate investigators that appear 
to be conflicted or incompetent for the task, and then simply award the grant 
randomly to any one of the remaining research teams.87     
One also should not be naïve about the possibility that this intermediary 
institution might become too cozy with the companies that are providing its 
revenue, and thereby shade its own decisions in favor of the companies ’ 
interests rather than patients’ interests. The NIH had an embarrassing string 
of scandals in the early 2000s, which revealed that NIH officials also received 
                                                   
84 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
85 See Dean Keith Simonton, Scientific Genius: A Psychology of Science  5, 42 
(1990) (discussing Thomas Kuhn’s recognition of an “essential tension” between the 
“traditionalist” and the “iconoclast” roles of a scientist and F. C. Bartlett’s differentiation 
between “original and routine information processing”). 
86 Indeed, the industry already outsources much of these routine testing functions to 
contract research organizations, the key is simply to break the yoke of influence over them. See 
Schafer, supra note 62, at 23 (under the status quo, “[c]ontract research organisations with a 
reputation for producing favourable results for drug companies’ products are likely to flourish, 
while those with more scrupulous standards are likely to go out of business”); see generally 
Phillip Mirowski & Robert Van Horn, The Contract Research Organization and the 
Commercialization of Scientific Research, 35 Soc. Stud. Sci. 503 (2005) (describing this 
trend). 
87 I thank Larry Lessig for this insight. 
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industry money through consulting and other relationships.88 Some have 
argued that the FDA has been “captured” by the companies it regulates, a 
problem that has allegedly gotten worse after the creation of a user-fee driven 
financing system.89 Still, the analysis must be comparative. Presumably, the 
NIH could maintain more independence from the commercial interests than 
the company managers that are currently administering these grants to 
investigators. Moreover, the randomization function would also be useful to 
prevent the intermediary from exercising biased discretion. 
Admittedly, the money-blinding mechanism would not eliminate every 
sort of bias that currently infects biomedical science. As long as industry 
chooses the topics for the research it funds, those topics will be biased towards 
investigations of patented drugs and devices for indications that have large 
potential markets. Non-financial biases will also continue to exist. For 
example, published research will continue to be biased towards studies that 
purport to disprove null hypotheses, rather than those that affirm the null 
hypothesis.90 The latter study, which simply shows that something does not 
work, seems less interesting and less exciting. One could craft other policies to 
address those problems while still conceding that the money-blind solves the 
problem it addresses.   
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF MONEY-BLINDING WITHOUT VIOLATING 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
How would such a requirement of money-blinding be enforced? There are 
several options for bringing such a mechanism to fruition, including private 
ordering mechanisms, which do not raise First Amendment problems, and 
regulatory efforts, which raise surmountable First Amendment problems. This 
section considers each. 
A. Private Ordering 
In a well-functioning market for information, one might hope that the 
industry would voluntarily adopt money-blinding as a way to maximize the 
persuasiveness of its publications, at least when its products really are as safe 
and effective as it claims.91 This dynamic, however, assumes that biomedical 
                                                   
88 See David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical 
Research, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/07/nation/na-nih7; 
David Willman, Ex-NIH Director Now Favors Limiting Drug Company Ties , L.A. Times, Mar. 
13, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/13/nation/na-nih13.  
89 Curt D. Furberg et al., The FDA and Drug Safety: A Proposal for Sweeping Changes, 166 
Archives Internal Med. 1938, 1940 (2006) (“Another problem may relate to the source of 
FDA funding. Critics of the FDA have claimed that the agency has gotten too close to the 
industry it is supposed to regulate, in part because of its dependence on user fees. Indeed, each 
of the past 3 iterations of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act has required that the FDA 
produce or perform something of value to the pharmaceutical industry in exchange for which 
the industry would agree to pay the fees. Until the last iteration, the FDA was prohibited from 
using any funds from user fees to support postmarketing studies of safety.”).  
90 See Gwendolyn B. Emerson & James D. Heckman, Testing for the Presence of Positive-
Outcome Bias in Peer Review, 170 Archives Internal Med. 1934, 1936 (2010) (showing 
positive-outcome bias in a randomized trial with peer reviewers for two journals).  
91 See generally Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. 
Econ. 107, 107 (1997) (providing a skeptical analysis of a similar market for advice); Gillian 
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journal editors and readers are able to, and actually do, perceive the biases in 
un-blinded research and discount the credibility of such studies accordingly.92 
As the foregoing analysis shows, this assumption is false.93  
Alternatively, one could imagine that the editors and peer reviewers of 
biomedical journals, such as the New England Journal of Medicine or the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, would simply refuse to publish 
studies that are not money-blinded, just as they currently disfavor studies that 
are not double-blinded. Of course, there is a transition problem. An 
intermediary institution will need to step forward, and there are currently 
thousands of merely double-blinded studies that are in the pipeline. But that 
problem is manageable. 
More fundamentally, there are some reasons to think that the biomedical 
journals may not rise to this occasion. First, there is a race-to-the-bottom 
problem. No single journal will want to unilaterally exclude the large 
proportion of articles that are industry-funded, if there are other journals 
blithely continuing to accept merely double-blinded studies. No journal wants 
to be scooped in reporting a significant advance in medical practice.  
Moreover, some of the biomedical journals are themselves addicted to 
industry money that comes either directly for the purpose of advertising, or to 
purchase reprints of favorable articles, or indirectly through the professional 
societies that run the journals and receive grants from industry.94 Thus, 
journal editors may be susceptible to industry boycotts or more subtle 
commercial pressures, just as they have previously expressed gratitude, on 
their editorial pages, for the largesse they currently enjoy.95  
Thus, if biomedical journals are going to succeed in implementing a 
money-blinding mandate, they may need to do so collectively, perhaps 
through the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE). 
Currently, nearly 1,000 journals follow the ICMJE’s Uniform Requirements 
for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals, which includes various 
requirements relating to conflicts of interests, but says nothing about 
blinding.96 One may reasonably hope that biomedical journals will rise to this 
occasion, but there are also other available levers of influence. 
                                                                                                                          
Hadfield et al., Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy , 21 J. 
Consumer Pol’y 131, 144 (1998) (“The complex nature of information also requires careful 
analysis of the potential for market mechanisms to provide the information consumers might 
want and need. Information is a notoriously difficult commodity over which to contract. 
Potential buyers of information have difficulty determining, in their uninformed state, the 
value of the information and thus the price they are willing to pay for it.”).  
92 See Robertson, supra note 43 (discussing this dynamic, and showing empirical evidence 
that laypersons fail to perform such discounting). 
93 See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing peer review and disclosures as ineffective 
solutions). 
94 See Debbie Sieber et al., Extent and Nature of Advertising in Leading Hematology-
Oncology Journals, 32 Am. J. Clinical Oncology 92, 92-93 (2009) (citing sources that the 
industry spent $850 million on journal advertising in 2005). 
95 See David Orentlicher & Michael K. Hehir, Advertising Policies of Medical Journals: 
Conflicts of Interest for Journal Editors and Professional Societies, 27 J.L. Med. & Ethics 113, 
114 (1999) (discussing the conflicts of interest inherent in the practice of accepting industry 
money, and discussing journal editors’ feelings and expressions of gratitude).  
96 See Journals that Have Requested Inclusion on the List of Publications that Follow the 
ICMJE’s Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals , Int’l 
Comm. of Med. Journal Editors,  http://www.icmje.org/journals.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
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Universities could exert influence in favor of money-blinding as a way to 
manage the conflicts of interests of its faculty. In recent years, several schools 
have made prominent efforts to revise their policies regarding whether and 
how faculty may accept money from the pharmaceutical and device 
industries.97 Announcing such revisions, Dr. Philip A. Pizzo, Dean of Stanford 
Medical School, said, “We welcome interactions with industry that are 
positive and collaborative. But where I think the line should not be crossed 
and where we are not going to allow our full-time or part-time faculty to 
engage is in marketing.”98 Yet, the industry itself seems to put biomedical 
science on the same side of the line as marketing, and thus university policies 
arguably should as well.99 In principle, after transitional problems are 
resolved, faculties should welcome such a change towards money-blinding, if 
it allows them to continue to garner industry funding without having to be 
accountable to industry influence.  
Still, a significant portion of biomedical science supported by industry is 
actually performed by the companies themselves through subsidiaries or 
clinical practice companies, without any involvement by university 
researchers.100 This is the most extreme form of un-blinded research, given 
that industry scientists can be handpicked and then fired at will, creating the 
greatest incentives and temptations for bias. Arguably, this practice should be 
stopped, and to the extent that such research is intended to inform and 
influence prescribing behavior, it should be outsourced to credible academic 
researchers, working with the protection of blinds. By refusing to publish un-
blinded studies, biomedical journal editors have the leverage to cause a shift 
in the economics of biomedical research.   
If biomedical journal authors, editors, and/or universities succeed in 
enforcing a norm of money-blinding, the industry could comply by simply 
channeling their existing expenditures for biomedical research to the 
intermediary. On the margin, however, companies may decide that it is not 
worthwhile to fund some studies, and face the risk of adverse results, if they 
are unable to influence the study. Thus, it is possible that on net, fewer 
                                                                                                                          
2011) (listing journals); Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical 
Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication , Int’l Comm. of Med. Journal 
Editors (Apr. 2011) http://www.icmje.org/urm_full.pdf (providing the policy).  
97 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Stanford Medical School to Expand Ethics Rules, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 21, 2010, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22docs.html (describing a new 
prohibition on adjunct faculty “giving paid speeches drafted by the makers of drugs or medica l 
devices”); School of Medicine Policy Overview, Stanford School of Medicine, 
http://med.stanford.edu/coi/overview.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). But see John 
Dorschner, Investigators Question Drug-Makers Payments to University of Miami Doctors, 
Miami Herald, Dec. 20, 2010, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/12/20/1982509/investigators-question-drug-
makers.html#ixzz18lCuiADQ (“Stanford was the lead example [of non-compliance with its 
own policy], with two doctors earning more than $100,000 in the past year  for making 
speeches paid for by drug companies, even though Stanford forbids its faculty from taking 
such fees.”). 
98 Singer, supra note 97.  
99 See supra text accompanying note 7 (quoting Pfizer documents). 
100 Jef Akst, Contract Research on the Rise, The Scientist (Aug. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.the-scientist.com/blog/display/55878/ (describing the history of this industry and 
its recent changes); see also sources cited supra note 86. 
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research dollars will be spent, but the studies that are funded and published 
will be less biased.  
B. Narrowly Conditioning NIH Funding 
Suppose that the biomedical journal authors and editors do not adopt 
money-blinding within a reasonable time. What levers are available to 
regulators to force such a transition? Are such governmental interventions 
consistent with the First Amendment?  
One option would be to attach conditions to the billions of dollars that the 
NIH spends in support of biomedical research. The NIH could also require 
that the individual investigators who receive funding for specific projects 
publish the primary results only in journals that have a satisfactory money-
blinding policy.101 In effect, this policy would force journals to choose between 
publishing NIH-funded research or publishing un-blinded research.   
The federal government already attaches all sorts of conditions to its 
research money, such as the requirement to submit protocols to Institutional 
Review Board and the requirement to publish raw data.102 Indeed, the NIH 
has compiled a list of over seventy other conditions on grant funding, on a 
gamut of topics from animal welfare and patient confidentiality, to the use of 
seat belts and smoke detectors.103  
Would such a condition on federal funding survive constitutional 
scrutiny? Arguably, it is a restriction on free speech, essentially telling 
investigators who receive federal money that they cannot write about their 
funded research in certain outlets, at least not until they have first published 
their primary results in money-blinded journals, as required by their grant 
contract. However, it is an extremely narrow restriction on speech, tailored to 
the expenditure of federal moneys. Likewise, one could imagine that when the 
United States Army purchases advertising from Madison Avenue agencies to 
support its recruiting efforts, the Army specifies which sorts of magazines to 
target and which to avoid (e.g., Guns and Ammo rather than Creative 
Knitting). Such an ad vendor could hardly raise a free speech objection to 
such a condition of federal funding.  
Indeed, in Rust v. Sullivan, the government had chosen to subsidize 
certain family planning services, while also prohibiting the funds from being 
used for counseling about abortion as a form of family planning. 104 The 
Supreme Court upheld the law, holding that:  
                                                   
101 Schematically, this mandate would be most similar to the requirement that 
investigators register at ClinicalTrials.gov certain clinical trials within twenty-one days of the 
first subject being enrolled, and then report summary results within one year of the 
completion date. See Nat’l Inst. of Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement, NIH Office of 
Extramural Research, § 4.1.3 exhibit 4, 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2010/nihgps_ch4.htm#public_policy_requiremen
ts_other_mandates (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
102 See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects: To What Does this 
Policy Apply?, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2008) (known as “the Common Rule”); Intangible Property, 
45 C.F.R. § 74.36 (2008) (giving the government the right to publish data and requiring 
recipient to publish data after Freedom of Information Act requests). 
103  See Nat’l Inst. of Health, supra note 101, § 4.1. 
104 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991). 
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the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead 
simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for 
which they were authorized. The Secretary’s regulations do not 
force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they 
merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and 
distinct from Title X activities.105  
Likewise here, the strings on NIH funding would simply be a narrow 
insistence about the way those public funds should be used, and thus would 
easily survive constitutional scrutiny. If an investigator prefers to publish in 
journals that do not require money-blinding, then she can simply seek 
funding elsewhere. If, on the other hand, an investigator accepts federal 
funding, the publication requirement applies only to that investigator, not to 
other researchers who are free to take industry money directly and publish in 
any journal they see fit. Thus, the constitutional case is straightforward.  
C. Attaching Strings to Federal Funding 
Suppose that the narrow conditions on funding would not suffice to 
change the behavior of top journal editors and authors, and thus the behavior 
of industry funders.106 A more ambitious governmental policy would attach 
strings that reach beyond the individual funded projects to impact all of the 
funded investigator’s work, and all of the work of other investigators  at her 
institution. The government could require that any institution that receives 
NIH funding (or other federal funding) refuse all industry funding to the 
institution, unless the industry money is routed through an accredited 
blinding intermediary.107 Many federal grant programs are already limited to 
non-profit and public entities, and thereby exclude industry from receiving 
such funds directly.108 And, the federal government already requires all grant 
recipients to maintain a conflict of interest policy, and to police the conflicts 
of interest that might impact the federal grant.109 This proposed policy extends 
that logic, building a taller wall between industry and the recipients of federal 
grants. 
Such a proposed policy would force an institutional choice between 
federal government money versus un-blinded industry money. Of course, it is 
                                                   
105 Id. at 196. 
106 In this situation, journals would likely become specialized, some accepting industry-
funded papers without the money blind and others accepting NIH-funded, foundation-funded, 
and money-blinded papers (if any). This outcome may be better than the status quo, if it helps 
consumers of science more appropriately weigh their reliance on the studies they read, using 
the journal’s name as a proxy for scientific objectivity. Nonetheless, the following analysis 
presumes that regulators want to go further to cause a more complete shift to money-blinding.  
107 An alternative policy would be to require all investigators at the funded institution to 
publish exclusively in money-blinded journals, regardless of the source of their funding. This 
would be a more direct regulation of speech, and is set aside for now.  
108 See, e.g., Health Resources and Services Admin.,  The Health Center Program: 
Summary of Key Health Center Program Requirements, 
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/requirements.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (“Health centers are 
non-profit private or public entities . . .”); The Office of Minority Health, Non-Profit 
Organizations, http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=2 (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2011) (“Only public or nonprofit private institutions of higher learning may 
apply for training grants . . . .”). 
109 See 40 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2010). 
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possible that some institutions would choose to reject all federal funding, 
rather than mandate money-blinding. Given the amount of money involved 
and the comparative prestige associated with NIH funding, it seems unlikely 
that major research institutions would reject federal funding with such strings 
attached.  
This proposed policy is more expansive than the previous one (see Part 
III.B supra) because it does not merely govern how the institution will spend 
the public money it receives. By instead screening which institutions receive 
federal money, this policy promotes public policy goals that are related to, but 
distinct from, the expenditure of public money, and thus arguably cannot take 
advantage of the narrow holding in Rust. Of course, the federal government 
has long used such string-tying mechanisms to achieve various and sundry 
public policy purposes that are not directly relevant to the scientific research 
being funded. For example, Congress has prohibited recipient institutions 
from discriminating against women in college sports and also forced such 
institutions to cooperate with discrimination against homosexuals in the 
military.110   
In 2008, the Supreme Court heard litigation over the Solomon 
Amendment, which required all institutions that receive federal funding to 
cooperate with military recruiters, notwithstanding their discriminatory 
practices.111 The Solomon Amendment seemed particularly onerous to law 
schools since the federal money was given for biomedical research on specified 
projects and had no direct relationship to the career services offices at the law 
schools, which nonetheless fell under its regulatory ambit. In Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the statute, holding that it 
neither denies the institutions the right to speak, nor requires them to say 
anything.112 By interpreting the ambit of the statute in this way, the Supreme 
Court avoided a clash with the First Amendment. Likewise, the instant policy 
does not directly regulate speech. Even if a university accepts federal funding, 
it can continue to say or write anything it wants, and thus there is no clash 
with the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has said, “Congress is free 
to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial 
assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept.” 113    
Still, to the extent that the proposed policy restricts grant recipients from 
also receiving un-blinded money from industry, it could indirectly regulate 
scientific expression.114 This analysis raises the “unconstitutional conditions” 
                                                   
110 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58 
(2006) (“Either allow military recruiters the same access to students afforded any other 
recruiter or forgo certain federal funds.”). 
111 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West 2011). The Solomon Amendment was repealed in early 
2011.  
112 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. at 60. 
113 Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984). In Grove City, the Supreme Court 
rejected a private college’s claim that conditioning federal funds on its compliance with Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 violated the First Amendment, without even 
reaching the First Amendment claims, because the school was free to decline federal money.  
114 In the context of political campaign finance, the Supreme Court has long scrutinized 
the regulation of money contributions because, in the mass media age, money is a necessary 
precondition to speech reaching its audience. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (holding that corporations have free speech rights); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 
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doctrine.115 “The government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis  
that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he 
has no entitlement to that benefit.”116 For example, in FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of California, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that withheld 
federal funding to public radio stations that insisted upon doing editorials on 
the air, a form of expression that “lies at the heart of First Amendment 
protection.”117    
On the other hand, because the government is here acting as contractor 
and not as sovereign, perhaps the indirect restrictions on speech would not 
compel strict scrutiny at all, but instead may require only a reasonableness 
analysis. In Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. 
Umbehr, the Supreme Court held that “[d]eference is therefore due to the 
government’s reasonable assessments of its interests as contractor.”118 The 
argument would be that the NIH’s restrictions will “prevail if it can persuade 
the District Court that the [the Government’s] legitimate interests as 
contractor, deferentially viewed, outweigh the free speech interests at stake.” 119 
If a court were to apply Umbehr to a situation involving the financing of 
medical research, then the regulation should be fairly easy to defend. Given 
                                                                                                                          
(1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s 
mass society requires the expenditure of money.”). Arguably, the proposed policy also regulates 
the grant recipient’s right of free association by proscribing the terms in which the recipient 
can associate with industry. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000), the 
Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association was vi olated by a 
state law that required the organization to accept a homosexual scoutmaster. The pattern in 
Boy Scouts was thus the opposite of the present proposal, which prohibits certain associations. 
Regardless of that distinction, the Boy Scouts holding is likely inapposite to the proposed 
policy for the same reason that the Court distinguished the case in Rumsfeld v. FAIR: the 
military recruiters were not members of the universities. Id. at 648. 
115 See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 
1421 (1989). 
116 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[I]f the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his 
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the 
government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Such interference 
with constitutional rights is impermissible.”). 
117 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984). 
118 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996). The Court wrote that the plaintiff “is correct that if the Board 
had exercised sovereign power against him as a citizen in response to his political speech, it 
would be required to demonstrate that its action was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest. But in this case, as in government employment cases, the Board 
exercised contractual power, and its interests as a public service provider, including its interest 
in being free from intensive judicial supervision of its daily management functions, are 
potentially implicated. Deference is therefore due to the government’s reasonable assessments 
of its interests as contractor.” Id. 
119 Id. at 685 (part III). This analysis presumes that the speech at issue is a matter of 
public concern. Although the First Amendment protects government employees and 
contractors’ rights to speak freely “on matters of public concern[,] . . . speech on merely 
private employment matters is unprotected.” Id. at 675 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
146 (1983)). It is not precisely clear where speech about the effectiveness of a dru g would fall 
on this spectrum. 
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the problem of biased science and its impact on the practice of medicine and 
national healthcare costs, along with the failure of status quo remedies of peer 
review and disclosure mandates, this simple weighing of interests would seem 
to favor the proposed policy.  
Aside from these complicated doctrines it is also true that, if the 
government could constitutionally use its power as a sovereign to directly 
regulate speech, it could thus use its power as a funder to do the same. 120 
Therefore it is worthwhile to consider the constitutionality of direct 
regulation, even if such a mechanism were not in fact employed. 
 D. Direct Regulation of Industrial Science  
Regulators could directly target drug- and device-makers, prohibiting 
them from using their money to unduly influence the science that tests the 
safety and efficacy of their own products. The policy would say that, if a 
company wishes to support scientific tests of its own products, then it needs to 
use a money-blinding mechanism to allow the investigators to work 
independently, so that the science is as objective as it purports to be. The 
regulator’s motivation would be to prevent physicians from being influenced 
by biomedical science that may appear to be robust and objective, but is 
actually biased and thus misleading.  
Although such a regulatory intervention may seem far-reaching, it is in 
accordance with current policies that prohibit pharmaceutical companies 
from promoting drugs beyond those indications that the FDA has approved. 121 
The FDA has held that “the ban on off-label promotion applies not just to 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies themselves, but also to 
financially-interested third-parties, such as physicians who participate in 
clinical trials or who are paid to promote the products on the manufacturer’s 
behalf” or the providers of Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs.122 
                                                   
120 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 59 
(2006).  
121 These policies do not arise from a single statutory source. See generally 21 U.S.C.S. § 
355 (LexisNexis 2006) (prohibiting the sale of unapproved drugs, and limiting their labels and 
accompanying material to “prescribing, recommending, or suggesting” uses which are 
supported by an adequate scientific basis); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-50 
(1948) (adopting an expansive definition of “accompanying material” to many forms of 
industry communications about their products); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1) (expanding this 
definition further to encompass virtually all efforts to promote the product); Gregory Conko, 
Truth or Consequences: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and Medical Device 
Promotion, 21 Health Matrix (forthcoming 2011) (Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
Working Paper No. 2010-9, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677609 (describing and criticizing this 
regulatory evolution).  
122 Conko, supra note 121, at 14 (citing FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported 
Scientific and Educational Activities, Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997)); see also 21 
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1) (2010) (regulating industry sponsored CME programs). The FDA’s 
rationale for this broad regulatory power rests on the statutory requirement that labels must 
describe the product’s intended use, and that industry efforts to promote another use suggest 
that the product is mislabeled in the first place. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,075 (“The ‘intended use’ 
of a drug or device refers to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the 
labeling of the product. This intent is determined by such persons’ expressions or by the 
circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article including, for example, labeling 
claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their 
384  AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE  VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011 
If the industry is using these people to promote their products off-label, then 
this would seem to show an intent to sell the product for off-label uses, which 
contravenes the current statute.123   
Presently, the FDA declines to regulate industry financial support for 
scientific and educational activities when those activities are “independent” 
from the drug- or device-maker, even if the company has funded the activity. 
In short, if “an industry-supported activity is independent,” then it is “not 
generally subject to regulation.”124 Arguably, because of the many vectors for 
influence discussed above, an industry-supported scientific research study 
could be independent only if the study was money-blinded.125 Just as in CME 
programs, if the company “is involved in the selection of” investigators, and 
the investigators “have reason to believe that future financial support from the 
company depends upon producing” publications “that promote the company’s 
products,” then the investigator is not independent.126 Accordingly, scholars 
have called for a central-pooling mechanism for CME funding, not unlike the 
solution for biased science proposed here.127 On the other hand, “companies 
and [investigators] who wish to ensure that their activities will not be subject 
to regulation should design and carry out their activities free from the 
supporting company’s influence and bias.”128 In short, adopt money-blinding.  
The FDA has provided a compelling First Amendment analysis of its 
regulation of industry influence in educational and scientific activities, such as 
CME programs, applying the well-known Central Hudson test.129 Rather than 
                                                                                                                          
representatives.”) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2010); 21 C.F.R. §  801.4 (2006); Alberty Food 
Prods. Co. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1950) (drug product was misbranded 
because its labeling failed to state the intended use of the drug as suggested by the company in 
newspaper advertisements)).  
123 But see Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the 
FDA, and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection , 37 
Am. J.L. & Med. 315, 343 (2011) (arguing that the FDA’s analysis is flawed because companies 
always know that their products will be used off-label, and thus such off-label promotion 
proves nothing). Klasmeier and Redish seem to assume that knowledge is necessarily 
equivalent to intent, but the distinction is routinely made throughout the law. See Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (distinguishing between knowledge 
and intent in another context: “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a 
violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, 
not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities”); United States v. Delgado, 
631 F.3d 685, 695 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that more is required than mere knowledge 
of the purpose of a conspiracy.”). 
124 FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities; 
Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997). 
125 See supra Part II.A. 
126 FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities; 
Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,083 (referring to CME providers). 
127 Robert Steinbrook, Financial Support of Continuing Medical Education , 299 JAMA 
1060, 1062 (discussing a solution of “eliminating direct or indirect commercial support of 
programs but allowing contributions to a central repository of funds, which, in turn, would 
disburse funds to approved programs”). 
128 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,084. 
129 The FDA relies on this explanation from the Supreme Court: 
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no 
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not 
accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or 
commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the communication is neither 
THE MONEY BLIND 385 
being an instance of political speech, which is at the core of the First 
Amendment, this regulation arises in the commercial context of healthcare—
drugs and devices in particular—which are already deeply regulated in 
America. As shown in Part I, it is now widely recognized by both biomedical 
journal editors and by the industry itself that these efforts to fund and 
manipulate science are designed to sell more drugs.130 The government’s 
interest is quite compelling. At a time when healthcare costs are consuming 
more than a sixth of the entire economy, there can be little doubt that the 
government has a compelling interest in seeing that biomedical science is 
accurate and objective.131  
Yet, the evidence shows that, at least in the aggregate, the speech in these 
industry-funded articles is biased and it misleads the physicians and 
regulators who rely upon it.132 Still, one must concede that not every industry-
funded article is biased, or that every biased article misleads physicians.133 The 
blinding proposal merely acts as a filter, allowing industry to continue funding 
scientific speech, but stripping it of its bias. To the extent that the science is 
not actually biased, then the industry money will pass through the 
intermediary and allow the same speech that the company intended. Part II 
has also shown that less intrusive responses to this problem—disclosure and 
peer review—have been tried, but failed.134 Thus, even while eliding over the 
nuances of a full-blown First Amendment analysis, it is clear that a money-
blinding mandate may survive constitutional scrutiny.   
                                                                                                                          
misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more 
circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in 
proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed 
carefully to achieve the State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be 
measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state 
interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only 
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on 
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive. 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (citations 
omitted). 
130 See Fugh-Berman & Melnick, supra note 5; see also United States v. Caronia, 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 385, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing whether “promotional activities amounted to 
scientific and academic speech, which resides at the core of the First Amendment”); Sax supra 
note 17, (discussing this point, and also concluding that industry-supported science is 
commercial speech). For a more foundational discussion, see Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by 
FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial? 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 388 (2011) (arguing that 
the answer to his titular question “is yes, but only if the stars align”). Arguably, industry-
funded science could be regulated through blinding even if it was not deemed commercial 
speech.   
131 Christopher J. Truffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The 
Recession’s Impact Continues, 29 Health Aff. 522, 522 (2010) (reporting that the health 
share of the gross domestic product was estimated at 17.3% in 2009).  
132 See discussion supra notes 16-21 and 38-48. 
133 For a similar argument in a related context, see Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 123, at 
345 (“But it surely does not follow that all claims made on behalf of off-label uses are 
inherently false or misleading.”). 
134 Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Under the Central 
Hudson analysis, it is ‘clear that if the Government could achieve its interest in a manner that 
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.’”) (citing 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002)). 
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The constitutional analysis can also be approached from an altogether 
different track, one that may avoid First Amendment scrutiny altogether. A 
money-blinding mandate could draw upon the bribery, kickback, gratuity, 
graft, and conflict of interest statutes that already exist to insulate the 
integrity of government officers from payments that would otherwise be 
protected as speech.135 It would clearly be illegal for a company to pay a 
government official a quid pro quo to declare that its drug is safe and 
effective.136 It would even be illegal to pay a government official to undertake a 
study that he otherwise would not have undertaken, or to do such a study on 
more favorable terms. Many courts have held that the laws proscribing this 
sort of behavior avoid First Amendment scrutiny altogether. 137 
Notwithstanding the language of these holdings, it may be more accurate to 
say that these restrictions on speech would withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
on the facts presented in these cases.138   
                                                   
135 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1962) (setting forth conduct constituting bribery and 
related fines); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2004) (also describing conduct constituting bribery); 41 
U.S.C. § 52(2) (2009) (defining “kickback”). 
136 See generally Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest In and Out of Government, 
at 6 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785520 (“If a government employee 
advises the government on how to handle a matter that could affect her own investments, she 
could end up in prison. A criminal statute prohibits government employees from participating 
in matters that can have a direct and predictable effect on their own financial interests.”).  
137 See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Threats and 
bribes are not protected simply because they are written or spoken; extortion is a crime 
although it is verbal”); United States v. Meachum, No. 08-3082 Slip Copy, 2009 WL 1255520, 
at *8 (W.D. Va. May 7, 2009) (same); Roberts v. State, 278 S.W.3d 778, 790 (Tex. App. 2008) 
(same); Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 
1184 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[C]ampaign contributions made ‘with a corrupt intent to influence . . . 
the person to whom it is given, in his action, vote, or opinion, in any public or offic ial capacity’ 
are not protected because they are not a ‘valid’ exercise of one’s constitutional ri ghts of free 
speech or petition”) (quoting Paul for Council v. Ricki Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1366-67 
(2001)); United States v. Tutein, 82 F. Supp. 2d 442, 447 (D. Virgin Is. 2000) (“[A] private 
party has no First Amendment right to petition the Government by means of . . . payment of 
bribes”) (quoting In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 
1979)); Dawkins v. State, 208 So.2d 119, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (“One cannot threaten, 
intimidate, bribe, or otherwise imminently seek to affect the outcome of grand or petit jury 
deliberations and then seek refuge in the First Amendment. . .”); see also United States v. 
Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1988) (“extortionate speech . . . is undoubtedly within 
the government’s power to prohibit”); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (“It may categorically be stated that extortionate 
speech has no more constitutional protection than that uttered by a robber while ordering his 
victim to hand over the money, which is no protection at all”); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 
628, 636-38 (Colo. 1999) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on a statute making it a crime 
to threaten a witness, so long as “threat” is limited to “expressions of intent to commit harm or 
injury to another’s person, property, or rights through commission of an unlawful act”); State 
v. Lance, 721 P.2d 1258, 1264-65, 1267 (Mont. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on a 
statute making it a crime to threaten to kidnap or unlawfully restrain any person).  
138 For an explanation of the doctrine, see Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the 
Uses of Language 249 (1989) (arguing that “[m]y basic position is that such utterances are 
genuinely situation-altering. They do not inform the listener about the environment he or she 
inhabits; they change that environment by generating options which did not previously ex ist 
and which would never have existed had it not been for the offer or threat. Because they do 
something rather than say something, they fall outside a principle of free speech.”). More 
accurately, an offer of a bribe both does something (create an incentive) and says something 
(notify of the incentive).  
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Extending this analysis, Kathleen Clark has suggested that government 
contractors should be held to similar standards as governmental employees, 
with regard to conflicts of interests.139 As a matter of statute, Congress has 
already extended the wire and mail fraud crimes to protect the objectivity of 
state officials and even of private persons (such as union bosses or company 
CEOs) from improper influence.140 In principle, the government could 
similarly proscribe industry efforts to improperly influence the discretion 
exercised by scientists. If Congress or the FDA extended such protection to 
biomedical researchers, it would not seem to cross any constitutional line, and 
thus the regulation deserves as little, or as much, First Amendment scrutiny as 
the current bribery, gratuity, and conflict of interest statutes.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that biomedical science drives a significant 
portion of the practice of medicine and the billions of dollars of spent on 
healthcare in America each year. Thus the integrity of biomedical science 
would seem to be foundational to a well-functioning healthcare system. It is 
critical that biomedical science be objective, and that it appear objective, so 
that physicians and regulators can confidently rely upon it.  
Once the root causes of biased science are well understood, we will be left 
with two options to solve the problem: an outright ban on industry support of 
biomedical science, or something like money-blinding—which would preserve 
industry’s subsidy of science while attempting to cleanse the money of any 
biasing influence. A ban on industry funding would be devastating to 
scientific progress, and would likely face insurmountable constitutional and 
political obstacles. Money-blinding is thus a promising partial solution, even 
if it would not completely extirpate industry’s role in setting the agenda for 
biomedical science. 
The legal analysis suggests that if private ordering fails there are multiple 
mechanisms for regulators to facilitate a move towards money-blinding, 
without running afoul of the Constitution. Whether a money-blinding 
mandate avoids First Amendment scrutiny altogether, is reviewed as 
commercial speech, or is reviewed under strict scrutiny, it has some 
reasonable likelihood of surviving.  
 
                                                   
139 See Clark, supra note 136, at 6 (sketching out the “the principles and policy 
considerations that should guide the development of financial conflict standards for outsiders 
who do the government’s work”). 
140 See 18 U.S.C § 1346 (2008) (proscribing honest services fraud); Skilling v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (construing the statute to cover only bribes and kickbacks, and 
arguing that the vague statute borrows content from the federal bribery s tatutes—which 
otherwise apply only to federal officials—or state officials who receive federal grant funds). I 
am not arguing here that the honest services statute actually criminalizes industry payments to 
independent biomedical researchers, though that argument would be provocative, given the 
seemingly limitless scope of the honest services fraud statute, even after Skilling. 
